15 October 1998

Politics in the Middle East is like a game of dominoes. Last week thousands of Palestinians, in a statement of solidarity with their Syrian allies, demonstrated by burning the Israeli flag. Shops and schools closed. Refugees brought their camp just south of Damascus to a standstill to protest against the threats that Turkey had lodged against Syria.

Ankara has accused Damascus of waging an 'undeclared war' in Turkey's Southeast, home to the Kurdish population, which has been fighting for autonomy for 14 years. A fight that left 29,000 dead. The all-powerful Turkish military warned Syria that unless it expelled the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan and ceased to harbour the PKK, there would be an increase in armed resistance. In typical fashion Syria denied any link to the PKK. In reality, behind these Byzantine political posturing, it is Turkey's military alliance with Israel that has pitted the Arab world against Ankara.

Despite the glaringly obvious differences that separate Turkey and Israel, there also exist stunning parallels. Two secular democracies frightened of the foreboding cloud of theocracy which threatens to engulf them, neither the Turkish (military) nor the Israeli (civilian) elite think of themselves as wholly part of the Middle East. In the midst of the Arab world, neither Muslim Turkey nor Jewish Israel is Arab: both aspire to western cultural values and political standards; both see themselves as European outposts in a hostile neighbourhood: both perceive themselves as confronting common enemies in Iran, Iraq and Syria. The military alliance between these two regional powers is considered by some to be the most significant strategic development in the region for the past 50 years. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the ever-deepening military ties between Israel and Turkey have sounded alarm bells in Teheran, Damascus and Baghdad.

While perhaps not a great love affair, the bond is born out of intense mutual interest which seems to coincide almost perfectly and extends back to Israel's early days when Turkey was one of the first countries to offer recognition, albeit discreet, to the nascent state. That mutual interest has grown rather than diminished over the years.

Both fear the innately hostile Islamic fundamentalism of Iran; the expansionist moves of Iraq and the terrorism backed by Syria, which has been adopted as an instrument of foreign policy. Jerusalem and Ankara are anxious to contain the Arab hostility to their states and while both countries seek to intensify their relationship with the European Union, both are held at arm's length by Brussels.

Culturally, psychologically and of course in Turkey's case, geographically, east meets west and, first world collides with third. "In addition to those factors," says Dr Philip Robins, fellow of St Anthony's College, Oxford, expert in Turkish and Middle Eastern affairs, "Turkey and Israel see themselves as having signed up to a series of global standards that other states in the region have not subscribed to. Both have adopted deregulation, concentrated on having a more export-oriented economy, which endeavoured to free the private sector from the ties of the state. Both have put a lot of effort into establishing stock exchanges and the regulating of such bodies has been done more successfully and come nearer to international standards than others in the region."

For Israel and Turkey, America's presence in the Middle East is seen as a profound, balancing force. And for the sake of appearances, at least, the Turks insist that due consideration is given to the Palestinians. According to Dr Robins the current policy line at the Turkish Foreign Ministry is: "They reserve the right to criticise Israel if it doesn't implement the spirit or letter of Oslo."

Perhaps the most significant development though is the substantial amount of money that Turkey has allocated for the procurement of arms. According to some estimates, Turkey will spend up to $30 billion over a 25-year period, which could make this a seminal moment in the relationship of both countries who also share a common sense of destiny and a common sense of threat.

Historically, the Turks have bought their arms from the United States or Germany, but recently they have encountered problems. In the US and the EU, the Greek lobby has made it difficult to ignore Turkey's abysmal human rights record. Germany, likewise, has attached strings to any further purchase of arms.

As far as the Israelis are concerned Turkey's human rights record is no worse than any other country in the region, while the Turks perceive the Israelis to enjoy huge influence in Washington. The Israelis do little to dispel this perception and the notion, not entirely misplaced, that Israel can open Washington doors for its friends. So, in addition to its profoundly pragmatic strategic value, Turkey regards its alliance with Israel as an opportunity to dilute the effect of the powerful Greek and Armenian lobbies in Washington.

"For a long time Turkey felt that good relations with Israel made it look better in the eyes of the United States," says Dr Robins. "It is probably true to say that the Jewish lobby has helped improve the image of the Turks in Washington and given them a platform which ensured their side of the story would be heard, and heard impartially."

Israel sees its relationship with Turkey as a quid pro quo, says Dr William Hale, reader in politics at School of Oriental and African Studies. "Turkey welcomes arms development with Israel as it gives them access to advanced weaponry, which means that Turkey doesn't have to rely on the US for their sole source of arms supply, although the independence granted is very limited. It also spreads Turkey's sphere of influence and opens the door into this Muslim region for Israel. As a result, it allows Israel to view Turkey as a limited, though potential, ally in the Middle East. " "But it is not a full-blown military alliance," says Dr Hale. "So far as we know it involves joint exercises and intelligence exchange which is of value to both sides. At best it can be described as fairly limited military co-operation. In the case of war we simply do not know how far Turkey would go to help Israel. The question is, would Israeli planes be allowed to fly in Turkish airspace to bomb Syria? Despite the best scenario Turkey would be reluctant to get involved in a Middle East war for the sake of Israel unless Syria attacked, which is unlikely."

While Turkish planes train in Israeli airspace, Israeli planes fly in Turkish airspace, providing unique, unprecedented and vital intelligence in northern Syria. "Turkey has a problem in that it needs to maintain good relations with the Arab countries of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi and the Gulf States," says Dr Hale.

"The closer Turkey gets to Israel the harder it is to balance the relations with the Arab states. About ten per cent of Turkey's foreign trade is done with the Middle East, and within that total Israel is a very, very small percentage." Says Dr Robins: "There exists a tension inside the Foreign Ministry, and it has always been there. The Arab lobby thinks that Turkey needs to maintain good relations with its Arab neighbours on Turkey's borders and with which they have strong economic ties. Turkey also gets a lot of oil from these countries. The non-Arab lobby believes that Israel is a like-minded, friendly country."