The following is the text of the statement by Hans Blix, executive chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission, to the United Nations on Friday concerning the status of weapons inspections in Iraq:

Mr. President:
Since I reported to the Security Council on Jan. 27, UNMOVIC has had two further weeks of operational and analytical
work in New York and active inspections in Iraq. This brings the total period of inspections so far to 11 weeks. Since
then, we have also listened on Feb. 5 to the presentation to the council by the U.S. Secretary of State and the
discussion that followed. Lastly, Dr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of talks in Baghdad with our counterparts
and with Vice-President Ramadan on Feb. 8 and 9.

Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of the work being performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq.

We have continued to build up our capabilities. The regional office in Mosul is now fully operational at its temporary
headquarters. Plans for a regional office at Basra are being developed. Our Hercules L-100 aircraft continues to operate
routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight helicopters are fully operational. With the resolution of the
problems raised by Iraq for transportation of minders into the no-fly zones, our mobility in these zones has improved.
We expect to increase utilization of the helicopters. The number of Iraqi minders during inspections had often reached a
ratio as high as five per inspector. During the talks in January in Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to
about one to one. The situation has improved.

Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were
performed without notice, and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence
that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming.

The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities,
presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural
sites. At all sites which had been inspected before 1998, re-baselining activities were performed. This included the
identification of the function and contents of each building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification of
previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, taking samples and discussions with the site personnel
regarding past and present activities. At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground
structures or buried equipment.

Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained a good knowledge of the industrial and scientific landscape
of Iraq, as well as of its missile capability but, as before, we do not know every cave and corner. Inspections are
effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between December 1998
and November 2002.

More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been collected at different sites. Three-quarters of
these have been screened using our own laboratory analytical capabilities at the Baghdad Centre (BOMVIC). The results to
date have been consistent with Iraq's declarations.

We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately 50 litres of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being
kept under UNMOVIC seal at the Muthanna site. One-third of the quantity has already been destroyed. The laboratory
quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, which we found at another site, has also been destroyed.
The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from 60 countries. This includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 15 IAEA
inspectors, 15 air crew, and 65 support staff.

Mr. President:

In my Jan. 27 update to the council, I said that it seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to
provide co-operation on process, most importantly prompt access to all sites and assistance to UNMOVIC in the
establishment of the necessary infrastructure. This impression remains, and we note that access to sites has so far been
without problems, including those that had never been declared or inspected, as well as to presidential sites and
private residences.

In my last updating, I also said that a decision to co-operate on substance was indispensable in order to bring, through
inspection, the disarmament task to completion and to set the monitoring system on a firm course. Such co-operation, as
I have noted, requires more than the opening of doors. In the words of resolution 1441 it requires immediate,
unconditional and active efforts by Iraq to resolve existing questions of disarmament either by presenting remaining
proscribed items and program for elimination or by presenting convincing evidence that they have been eliminated. In the
current situation, one would expect Iraq to be eager to comply. While we were in Baghdad, we met a delegation from the
government of South Africa. It was there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence of the world in its
dismantling of the nuclear weapons program, by a whole-hearted co-operation over two years with IAEA inspectors. I have
just learned that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a group of experts for further talks.

How much, if any, is left of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and related proscribed items and programs? So far,
UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared
and destroyed. Another matter and one of great significance is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted
for. To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were
"unaccounted for." One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded.
If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not exist, credible evidence to that effect should
be presented.

We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence organizations are convinced and assert that proscribed weapons,
items and programs continue to exist. The U.S. Secretary of State presented material in support of this conclusion.
Governments have many sources of information that are not available to inspectors. Inspectors, for their part, must base
their reports only on evidence, which they can, themselves, examine and present publicly. Without evidence, confidence
cannot arise.

Mr. President:

In my earlier briefings, I have noted that significant outstanding issues of substance were listed in two Security
Council documents from early 1999 and should be well known to Iraq. I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax,
the nerve agent VX and long-range missiles, and said that such issues "deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than
being brushed aside." The declaration submitted by Iraq on Dec. 7, despite its large volume, missed the opportunity to
provide the fresh material and evidence needed to respond to the open questions. This is perhaps the most important
problem we are facing. Although I can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence
needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling
the questions.

In my January update to the council, I referred to the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting
chambers, construction of a missile engine test stand and the import of rocket engines, which were all declared to
UNMOVIC by Iraq. I noted that the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah could very well represent prima facie cases of proscribed
missile systems, as they had been tested to ranges exceeding the 93.8-mile (150-kilometre) limit set by the Security
Council. I also noted that Iraq had been requested to cease flight tests of these missiles until UNMOVIC completed a
technical review.

Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days with experts from a number of member states to discuss these
items. The experts concluded unanimously that, based on the data provided by Iraq, the two declared variants of the Al
Samoud 2 missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometres in range. This missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq
pursuant to resolution 687 and the monitoring plan adopted by resolution 715.
As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of the missile data supplied by Iraq was required before the
capability of the missile system could be fully assessed.

With respect to the casting chambers, I note the following: UNSCOM ordered and supervised the destruction of the casting
chambers, which had been intended for use in the production of the proscribed Badr-2000 missile system. Iraq has
declared that it has reconstituted these chambers. The experts have confirmed that the reconstituted casting chambers
could still be used to produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometres.
Accordingly, these chambers remain proscribed.

The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that is nearing completion and have assessed it to be
capable of testing missile engines with thrusts greater than that of the SA-2 engine. So far, the test stand has not
been associated with a proscribed activity.

On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported outside of the export-import mechanism and in contravention of
paragraph 24 of resolution 687, UNMOVIC inspectors were informed by Iraq during an official briefing that these engines
were intended for use in the Al Samoud 2 missile system, which has now been assessed to be proscribed. Any such engines
configured for use in this missile system would also be proscribed.
I intend to communicate these findings to the government of Iraq.

At the meeting in Baghdad on Feb. 8 and 9, the Iraqi side addressed some of the important outstanding disarmament issues
and gave us a number of papers, for example regarding anthrax and growth material, the nerve agent VX and missile
production. Experts who were present from our side studied the papers during the evening of 8 February and met with
Iraqi experts in the morning of Feb. 9 for further clarifications. Although no new evidence was provided in the papers
and no open issues were closed through them or the expert discussions, the presentation of the papers could be
indicative of a more active attitude focusing on important open issues.

The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the quantities of anthrax and two VX-precursors, which had been
declared unilaterally destroyed, might be tackled through certain technical and analytical methods. Although our experts
are still assessing the suggestions, they are not very hopeful that it could prove possible to assess the quantities of
material poured into the ground years ago. Documentary evidence or testimony by staff that dealt with the items still
appears to be needed.

Not least against this background, a letter of Feb. 12 from Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate may be of relevance.
It presents a list of 83 names of participants "in the unilateral destruction in the chemical field, which took place in
the summer of 1991." As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains an important reason
why quantities of chemicals have been deemed "unaccounted for," the presentation of a list of persons who can be
interviewed about the actions appears useful and pertains to co-operation on substance. I trust that the Iraqi side will
put together a similar list of names of persons who participated in the unilateral destruction of other proscribed
items, notably in the biological field.

The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had been appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty
chemical weapons warheads, had had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed items. This was
welcomed.